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Purpose - In this paper we develop a theoretical explanation of conflicts and 
incompatible interpretations of events between agents of Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) and actors present in certain host countries. We situate the argument in 
comparative economic systems as a part of a broader social system. The socio-economic 
system can be modeled using institutional theory, particularly using Scott’s (2001) three 
pillars and the concept of formal and informal institutions. Within different socio-
economic systems a dominant logic is developed, and this becomes internalized among 
actors and agents as behavioral scripts.  
Design/ methodology/approach - We use a multi-level and multi-disciplinary 
conceptual analysis, developing a model of dominant logic and behavioral scripts with 
MNC agents and traditional emerging economy actors. 
Findings - MNC agents and traditional emerging economy actors have difficulty 
comprehending the logic of the other, creating a fertile context for conflict. 
Research implications - An ideal type template is developed that can be used for 
empirical investigations focusing on situations where disagreement and conflict occur 
when MNCs operate in traditional emerging economies. 
Practical implications – By integrating our conceptualization into training for expatriate 
managers, the potential for conflict can be reduced. 
Originality/value – This multi-level and multi-disciplinary model allows grounded 
development of our understanding of conflicts or potential conflicts in the MNC agent – 
traditional emerging economy actor context. 
Keywords – MNC agents, traditional emerging economy actors, dominant logic, 
comparative economic systems, behavioral scripts, institutions 
Paper type – Position paper (viewpoint) 
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Logics of Local Actors and Global Agents: Divergent Values, Divergent World 
Views 
 
In 2000, Cochabamba, Bolivia was the epicenter of unprecedented social unrest 
known as the “Cochabamba Water Wars,” due to the privatization of the municipal 
water supply. The conflict drew international attention as a result of several factors. 
First, it created a state of emergency in Bolivia, which led to food shortages, stranded 
passengers, and blocked access to main roads. Second, it involved several important 
agents and actors, including the Bolivian government, local activists, and agents of 
several multinational corporations and organizations. Specifically, a subsidiary of US-
based Bechtel was granted the privatization of Cochabamba’s water in a transaction 
supported by the World Bank. This led to water becoming an economic commodity, 
rather than a freely consumable resource, like air (Olivera, 2004). Essentially, the local 
traditional logic of access to the natural supply of water was fundamentally different 
from the global economic logic of allocating water as a scarce resource. Ultimately 
Bechtel was forced to withdraw (Spence & Shenkin, 2008; Birke & Bohm, 2006). 
 
In 2011 Anglo-Austrian mining giant Rio-Tinto was facing a challenge to hold on 
to its remaining property in Guinea, after having lost half of its original mining 
concession in 2008. The newly elected president of Guinea, Alpha Condé, has indicated 
that existing contracts with Rio-Tinto had not yielded much benefit for his country, and 
would be voided, while Rio-Tinto blamed the government of Guinea for being slow to 
process necessary paperwork, preventing the development of the mines. After a meeting 
between Rio-Tinto CEO, Tom Albanese and Guinea Minister of Mining Mohamed 
Lamine Fofana the interpretations of the resolution of the issues were quite different. 
Rio-Tinto says the meeting was “a time for congratulations, rather than talking detailed 
business,” while Minister Fofana says, “the government will not come back to the 2008 







Were the strategies used by Bechtel or Rio-Tinto adequate given the reactions 
experienced in Bolivia or Guinea? These events are not unique in the landscape of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in foreign countries.  In fact, most MNCs 
experience international interactions that range from munificence to unease, which may 
result in conflict.  While the former is desirable, the latter can be very costly, 
economically, politically, and socially to the firm and country actors alike.  
Extant international management literature has come a long way in improving our 
understanding of interactions between MNCs and their host countries. However, the 
rapidly and dynamically changing global context requires scholars to reflect on how 
existing theories explain recent and current reality. Gilpin (2000, 2001) argues the 
twenty-first century will find economic relations ever more filled with conflict due 
to rival objectives of various MNCs, nations, economic classes and powerful 
groups.  In the emerging or developing countries evidence of such conflicts can be found 
in resource-intensive regions, where MNCs seek access to valuable assets, such as 
precious metals, minerals, oil, and labor and are often faced with protests from local 
populations and anti-globalization groups.  We develop a theoretical framework to 
unpack the conundrums and riddles faced by MNCs from advanced market economies 
that operate globally in socio-economic contexts different from their own.  
Economic activity does not occur in a vacuum, but rather is nested in patterns of 
economic and social relationships (Dacin, Ventresca & Beal, 1999).  Different countries, 
regions of countries or transnational regions have patterns of social relationships that 
coalesce around certain values or traditions (Hofstede, 1980; Vinken, Soeters & Ester, 
2004). These traditions are not simply a vestige of a primeval past, but rather, they 
represent an important force guiding the economic, political, and social functioning of 
these countries.  We focus on the actions and strategies of MNCs from advanced market 
economies operating in emerging economies or regions, particularly those that have a 
strong history of socioeconomic interactions based on tradition. We justify this choice by 
the desire to obtain more distance between actors, which, in turn, allows us to observe 
clusters of behaviors and actor attributes more clearly. We acknowledge inherent 
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limitations in this approach.  Our objective is not to develop a rigid schema of country 
classifications and characteristics, but rather to develop a theoretical framework helpful 
in understanding the differences in the two logics. 
We frame our discussion in five related areas: (1) institutions, (2) comparative 
economic systems, (3) actors and agents, (4) dominant logic and (5) behavioral scripts. 
All economic systems are embedded in a social context. These social contexts and 
characteristics of each economic system can be mapped and understood using 
institutional theory. At the social level this institutionalized understanding of the 
socioeconomic interactions becomes a dominant logic, and at the individual level this 
dominant logic becomes part of daily life and deciphering of events through behavioral 
scripts. 
This discussion is particularly relevant in relation to tradition based emerging 
economies. Scholarly management literature over the past thirty years has focused on 
international business from the perspective of MNCs from one particular socioeconomic 
context having operations in another socioeconomic context in three ways: (1) operating 
in a region similar to that of the MNCs’ home country, (2) making minor modifications 
of the MNC core strategy to adapt to the host country, or (3) using the MNC’s economic 
power to shape and exploit the opportunities in the host country (see, for example,  
Dunning, 1980; Ghoshal, 1987; Buckley, 1988; Hennart, 2001; Rugman & Verbeke, 
2003). While this literature has been a useful reflection of the MNC context, it is 
incomplete today, particularly for operations in tradition-based emerging economies. In 
the present context, the world is experiencing a new balance between emerging 
economies and the advanced market economies of the late twentieth century. Over the 
past five years the compound annual growth rate has been 11.2% for China and 8.6% for 
India, but only 0.9% for the United States (Index of Economic Freedom, 2012). The 
International Monetary Fund estimates the emerging economies will grow at an annual 
rate of 5.4% in 2012 and 5.9% in 2013, while the advanced market economies will grow 
at a 1.2% rate in 2012 and 1.9% in 2013 (IMF 2012: 2) Most of the net growth in 
employment and consumption will occur in the emerging economies over the next five 
years, and available natural resources in the advanced economies have been largely 
depleted, increasing dependence on the emerging economies (Hilsenrath & Cordeiro, 
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2011). These dramatic changes suggest a necessity to reconceptualize the nature of the 
relationships between MNCs and emerging economies. 
 
2. The frame of the argument 
We organize extant literature around several key mechanisms, which provide 
different levers to understand the MNC–host country dynamics and allow us to navigate 
through multiple levels of analysis in a logical manner.  Accordingly, we frame our 
discussion in five related areas: (1) institutions, (2) comparative economic systems, (3) 
actors and agents, (4) dominant logic and (5) behavioral scripts. 
 
2.1 Institutions 
Institutions are understood here as those “supraorganizational patterns of human 
activity by which individuals and organizations produce and reproduce their material 
subsistence and organize time and space. They are also symbolic systems, ways of 
ordering reality, and thereby rendering experience of time and space meaningful” 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991: 243). Institutions can be formally constructed and governed 
or informal and intuitive. Scott (2001) offers the following important characteristics of 
institutions: (1) Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of 
resilience; (2) Institutions are composed of culture-cognitive, normative, and regulative 
elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and 
meaning to social life; (3) Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, 
including symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts; (4) Institutions 
operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to localized interpersonal 
relationships; (5) Institutions, by definition, connote stability but are subject to change 
processes, both incremental and discontinuous. 
 
2.2 Comparative economic systems 
Economic systems have been defined as a "set of methods and standards by which 
a society decides and organizes the allocation of limited economic resources to satisfy 
unlimited human wants; how a society goes about transforming the natural world into 
material goods” (Conkin, 1991: 1). Dozens of variations of economic systems have been 
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identified, some are very familiar to today’s scholars of international business, including 
capitalism, socialism, Islamic, libertarian, mercantilism, feudalism, traditional, market, 
planned, command or indicative. Others are less familiar, such as syndicalism, 
progressive utilization, hydraulic despotism, or anarcho-communism (Gardner, 1988; 
Stuart & Gregory, 2003). An economic system is embedded in a social/cultural milieu 
and reflects the values of that society. Both the economic system and social system can 
be mapped using Scott’s three institutional pillars (culture-cognitive, normative, and 
regulative) and these institutions can be formalized/documented or informal/intuitive. 
We contrast two economic systems: the advanced market economic model and the 
traditional economies as defined by Polanyi (2002) and found in many pre-industrial 
emerging societies today. Advanced infrastructure, a highly educated workforce, stable 
democratic governments, and a high per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
characterize the advanced market economies. The tradition based emerging economies 
are characterized by evolving technology, underdeveloped infrastructure, a heavy 
reliance on non-governmental forms of social structuration and control, and a weak or 
inefficient market system (Polanyi, 2002). 
We focus on contrasting the context of the advanced market economies with that 
of the traditional emerging economies for two reasons. First, most MNCs originated in 
and have grown to be global players within the advanced market economies. Emerging 
country MNCs are growing, but they still make up only a fraction of the global economic 
activity (Gammeltoft, Pradhan, & Goldstein, 2010). Second, MNCs are increasingly 
drawn to traditional economies because the MNC home markets are experiencing 
resource depletion, high production costs and stagnating consumption. Alternatives to 
these are available in the traditional emerging economies. Third, the MNCs of advanced 
market economies have resource abundance in financial capital, knowledge and 
proprietary information. MNCs are searching for places where they can put these 
resources to work and create new growth opportunities. 
We acknowledge limitations in this choice of context, but still consider it optimal 
in our quest to develop clear archetypes that facilitate grasping the core argument. We 
prefer not to identify particular countries, as the core of the argument is not about 
countries, but rather about different logics. It is undeniable that parts of China and India 
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are rapidly moving toward the global economic logic. But there remain regions of China 
and India that are heavily grounded in a local traditional logic. We seek to develop an 
awareness that different logics exist, not that these logics are differentiated on the basis of 
a particular institutionally defined geographic border.  The international setting serves as 
potential empirical context that illustrates these dynamics more clearly. 
 
2.3 Actors and Agents 
On the playing field of the various economic systems indicated above, 
interactions occur between agents and actors.  In this analysis we use the concept of 
agents and actors as developed by Sorge (2005). Within that framework, actors function 
through spontaneous action systems based on social tradition, while agents function 
deliberately within an institutionally defined process. At the very basis of this distinction 
we see actors and agents having different perceptions of reality, where the actor’s reality 
is based on social and cultural tradition, while the agent’s reality is based on a global 
economic system (Djelic, 1998). Furthermore, agents appear as proactive economic 
opportunity seekers, while actors are motivated primarily by the desire to preserve a way 
of life.  The concept of tradition allows for actors to express concern for economics, as 
means to an end, but not as primary purpose. In this conceptualization, we see actors as 
unbound by the same institutional frameworks or constraints as the agents.  
Sorge’s work describes the process by which actors and agents come to mutual 
accommodation through a layering process over time. We support Sorge’s 
conceptualization. Our argument is focused on the initial meeting of the two logics. We 
acknowledge that local traditional based economies are moving toward a postmodern 
world, but this does not happen instantaneously or seamlessly.  
We use the term actor to define individuals acting within the local tradition based 
community. Agents are individuals who act representing the Multinational Corporation.  
Both actors and agents are shaped by their socio-cultural environment, within which an 
economic system is situated. Agents who are native to the tradition-based emerging 
economy may experience conflict, or alternatively may have experienced extensive 
socialization into the milieu of the MNC such that they can compartmentalize their native 
socialization from their corporate socialization. 
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2.4 Dominant Logic 
Dominant logic is “the way in which (individuals) conceptualize and make 
critical… decisions” (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986:490). It is a subtle understanding of the 
way the world works. MNC agents or local actors internalize it through schemas, 
mindsets and cognitive maps. Agents or actors interpret information received from the 
external environment, filtering it in such a way that data that is inconsistent with their 
dominant logic is ignored, while data that is supportive of the dominant logic is given 
more weight than it might warrant. Dominant logic is a subtle but real force that 
“predisposes one to certain problems and interacts with organizational structure and 
systems in causing strategic problems” (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995:9). 
Dominant logics come into play by establishing a cognitive mindset within 
individuals that is consistent with the actor’s or agent’s history and culture. It allows 
agents and actors to develop heuristics that facilitate rapid decision-making. In a stable 
equilibrium environment this logic can be useful and favorably routinized. It can also 
become part of the set of competencies, which distinguish a firm from its competitors or a 
local community or region from its neighbors.  However, in a turbulent and non-
equilibrium environment, the dominant logic can be an impediment to successful 
adaptation.  
The discussion of dominant logics is relevant here because it leads actors and 
agents to formulate strategies and make decisions in a routinized and preconscious 
manner — one that reflects the dominant logic of their environment (Oliver, 1997). This 
suggests the very distinct likelihood that decisions consistently embed the schemas of one 
logic or another.  To illustrate, the dominant logic of the MNC agent from the advanced 
market economy emphasizes effectiveness and efficiency, areas where the MNC excels, 
and for which the global market rewards it. However, when these values are transferred 
to traditional emerging countries, the actions resulting from these logics may be 
interpreted as illegitimate or inappropriate (Maclean & Hollinshead, 2011).  
Because the dominant logics of the MNC agents and the local actors are self-
referential and emanate from significantly different contexts, direct communication 
between the two is difficult; the same words, observations and observable reality can 
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have different meanings to the MNC agents and the local actors (Seidl, 2007). It is this 
different interpretation of what is legitimate and appropriate that can cause difficulties, 
because a lack of understanding of each party’s logic can lead to significant 
misunderstandings or conflict, as illustrated by the two vignettes we provide at the outset. 
 
2.5  Behavioral scripts 
For a dominant logic to impact the interactions between MNC agents and local 
actors, each must have a respective collective conscience that is internalized at the 
cognitive level (Scott, 1992). These behavioral scripts are in the form of deeply 
embedded templates that are taken for granted and unconsciously enacted (Johnson, 
Smith & Codling, 2000) in making routine or strategic decisions. These behavioral scripts 
are a product of the context within which the agent or actor has become socialized into 
his or her environment. Such scripts are the personal internalization of the society’s 
culture, taken for granted norms and acceptable patterns of worldview. These deeply 
ingrained scripts often prevent an actor or agent from comprehending the possibility of 
other behavioral scripts, or if they are grasped, the alternatives are often seen as 
illegitimate, irrational or irrelevant, because they are not built on systematically similar 
core cultural tenets (Özkazanc-Pan, 2008).  
Our argument, therefore, rests upon an understanding that MNC agents and host 
country actors act upon different behavioral scripts, which reflect the dominant logic of 
their environment. This results in observable unease, where, from the perspective of the 
global economic logic, the local traditional logic is perceived as being irrational or 
quaint, while from the local traditional logic the global economic logic is perceived as 
cold, calculating and lacking in human sensitivity (Özkazanc-Pan, 2008).  
So far, we described five mechanisms, which delineate the interaction between 
agents and actors, across multiple levels of analysis and stages of abstraction.  We build 
on these moving forward and develop an ideal type framework to describe two 
archetypes. Such typologies form a theoretical framework useful in developing models 
that can be empirically investigated (Doty & Glick, 1994). 
 
3 Different worldviews 
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3.1 Why did the Bechtel agents and the Cochabamba actors view water so 
differently? Why did the Rio Tinto CEO view the outcome of a meeting with the Guinean 
Minister of Mines so differently? Why do MNCs continue to experience resistance as 
they expand operations into emerging countries? In this section we utilize our framing 
elements to explore why these conflicts and misunderstandings can occur. 
 
3.2 Define two logics 
To find common ground in our analysis of this relationship, we examine two 
different dominant logics. The first logic is that of the MNCs from the advanced market 
economies, and we title this global economic logic. We propose that MNCs from the 
advanced market economies act on the basis of economic rationality and their managers 
are mentally motivated and guided by the identity referents and the cultural environment 
specific to the advanced market economies where these organizations evolved.  This 
rationality is founded on an economic legitimacy.  It is based on a strategic process of 
mobilization of specialized resources guided by an orientation toward efficiency (Djelic, 
1998).  This economic design is well described in management, through the work of 
Porter (1979) on competition, of Williamson (1979) on transaction costs and Barney 
(1997) on resources.  It is largely an abstract intellectual epistemology. Managers of 
MNCs from the advanced market economies generally adopt strategies strongly 
determined by this rationality.  
The logic of MNC success being based on economic and financial performance 
has become a cognitive assumption among executives and scholars; the underlying 
reasonableness is not often questioned. This focus on economic efficiency and 
effectiveness is the accepted and rational approach for understanding MNC strategy, 
actions and performance. It is grounded in assumptions of bounded rationality, goal 
specificity and formalization. We acknowledge a growing interest in the related areas of 
corporate social responsibility and corporate sustainability, which expand the meaning of 
firm performance by including metrics relative to the natural and social environments.  
Much of that literature perpetuates the economic logic, by providing firms with tools that 
allow them to find new opportunities for efficiency or growth. The continued use of 
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economic logic in MNCs leads to dynamic decision processes that are necessary to attain 
high levels of efficiency, effectiveness and financial performance. Management 
development programs, promotion decisions and strategic processes in MNCs are all 
aligned with these economic goals. 
The other logic relates to the behavior and strategies developed by actors in 
emerging countries and we title this local traditional logic.  Such behavior and strategies 
reflect local traditions and values, which often emphasize community, clan or sharing.  
This is due not only to cultural referents (Adler, 1997) specific to these countries, but also 
to the institutional frameworks in which strategies are developed.  These are founded on a 
traditional legitimacy, in which the dominant rationality rests more on the community-
based and clan-like social bonds than on economic performance (Inda & Rosaldo, 2002). 
The local traditional logic reflects a radically different cultural environment than 
that of predominantly market-based economies. Emerging economies, especially those 
with a strong tradition referent, often have institutional instability, informal constraints on 
decision-making, a non-monetary exchange system, and a great emphasis on tradition, 
heritage, family, clan and informal rules and norms (Hoskisson et al. 2000; Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997; Peng & Heath, 1996). When compared with advanced market economies, 
tradition based emerging countries have a different macroeconomic base from which to 
work and a non-codified institutional framework constraining decisions.  
The presence of different logics is not unique to the economic logic of MNCs and 
more traditional social economies, although we are emphasizing this pairing. Maclean 
and Hollinshead (2011) found evidence of conflicting logics when the Turkish MNC 
Eden acquired the Serbian brewer Weisser. Clear evidence was present of the MNC 
actors’ viewing the world through a global economic logic, which conflicted with the 
local Serbian agents more traditional local logic. 
 
3.3 Characteristics of the two logics 
What might be some of the characteristics of the global economic logic and the 
local traditional logic?  When using our approach to the analysis of global-local logics, 
the complexity in the relations between agents of the MNC and the actors in the tradition 
based economy become central. Each has a different way of seeing the world, and each 
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operates according to different rationalities.  The cognitive and cultural elements, as well 
as the normative and regulating aspects of institutions, determine the rules, standards and 
cultural values, which, in turn, shape the ways of thinking and behavior (Inda & Rosaldo, 
2002). The normative standards in emerging countries are based primarily in culture, 
history or community (Miller, 1995) while the normative standard in advanced market 
economies is more focused on issues of cost-effectiveness, efficiency and financial 
performance (Djelic, 1998). Each institutional environment will shape and evolve 
through multiple unique and legitimate rationalities (Scott, 2001). The institutional 
processes set the parameters of what is agreed upon as being rational or logical within a 
given social framework. 
The advanced market economies function with a more rational, and less 
communal or traditional sense of decision-making. Rational theories are built around goal 
specificity and formalization and are integrated into the concept of bounded rationality 
(Scott, 1992). The local institutional environment and cultural dimensions of traditional 
emerging economies can call into question assumptions of goal specificity, formalization 
and boundedly rational decision processes (Hafsi & Gauthier, 2003). Traditional 
emerging economies display less stable and formal political, regulatory, and economic 
institutions, while informal local institutions have power and are important for decision 
making within organizations. Managerial ties are more central in business relationships in 
environments with a higher level of uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salanick 1978; Powell 1990) 
when formal institutions, such as laws and regulations, are weak, and informal local 
institutions play a major role in economic activities (Peng & Heath 1996). A slower and 
more patient process of mutual discussion and socializing is required in emerging 
economies to reach agreement (Child 2001).  
Table 1 demonstrates and synthesises sample characteristics of the two logics. This 
table shows the anticipated differences between advanced market economies and local 
traditional economies, and can be used as the specification for an ideal type methodology 
(Weber, 1949) for empirical work.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
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To illustrate, we argue that the advanced market economies are more likely to have 
individualistic cultures and monetary-based exchange cultures, while the traditional 
economies are more likely to have communitarian and non-monetary exchange cultures.  
Morris et al. (1998) showed that in contexts where values and conceptions of purposes 
are individualistic, dynamism and the use of a competitive management style become 
essential. Individual rationality is legitimate, and this is reflected in the dominant logic. 
Lodge and Vogel (1987) showed that in contexts where values and conceptions of 
purposes are less individualistic and more communitarian, efforts to sustain community 
and provide for the members of the collective are central; decision processes are less 
dynamic and ‘conformity’ will be considered as a value among managers (Schwartz, 
1994).  Jaeger (1990) argued that in the traditional economies culturally defined 
limitations constrain the accepted rationality of individuals. A high degree of power-
distance and a high degree of uncertainty avoidance makes decision and authority 
processes less dynamic in these contexts. Child (2001) built upon this, arguing that in 
traditional economies local social relationships become more central to defining the 
dominant logic.  
Traditional economies can be generally characterized as having high degrees of 
environmental uncertainty and turbulence; centralized control of the economic and 
political systems; relatively weak and unstable legal systems; underdeveloped 
infrastructure; and lack of developed financial service institutions.  For example, in many 
traditional economies there is a lack of consistency between old and new laws.  
Moreover, while many traditional economies use French or English civil laws, they retain 
few procedural aspects, and even fewer updates of these procedures are legislated.  As a 
result, the legal environment of traditional economies is often unsupportive of economic 
activity, which generally requires swift, uncluttered legal procedures.   
As such, a local tradition based country’s logic is stressed when confronted with 
the MNC’s global economic logic, particularly when the local economy is dependent on 
the MNC for economic development. In emerging economies, market-supportive 
institutions are weak to begin with, based largely on cognitive conceptualizations 
founded in tradition, untested by economic thought. In these societies values and norms 
are often transferred from one generation to the next through oral patterns, rather than the 
14 
formalized and rationalized processes of the advanced market economies, such as formal 
education, regulations, written manuals, textbooks or prescribed processes to uncover the 
best practices in formulating a decision. 
 
4.  Implications 
We have argued that, when a MNC operates in a local emerging economy 
environment, its agents carry with them the behavioral script of the advanced market 
economy (Johnson, Smith, & Codling, 2000). Given the weak and informal institutional 
framework in the traditional emerging economy, these MNC agents observe not a 
conflicted institutional structure, but rather —from the global economic logic script— an 
empty institutional frame.  
Seeing this institutional void, the MNC agents seek to improve the weak 
institutional structure of the host country. To these agent/managers a stronger formal 
institutional frame would reflect the value of the advanced market economy, which the 
agents have internalized in their behavioral script. The agent’s efforts are proactive, 
positive and carried out in the belief that these actions will be beneficial to the emerging 
economy. But this transition pits traditional local practices and values against rational 
economic institutional frames. For Bechtel water was a valuable economic resource, but 
for the Cochabambians water was a gift from mother earth. 
The above may paint a picture consistent with observed misunderstandings and 
conflicts between MNC agents and local actors, and one can argue it offers little beyond a 
theoretical grounding of what we observe in the daily world. Given the successes of 
MNCs in efficiently and effectively mobilizing economic resources, why would these 
corporations want to develop strategies for traditional emerging economies that can 
achieve corporate objectives that can also acknowledge the value of the local traditional 
logic? The existing international business literature does not adequately address this 
question, and our framing of the two logics adds an explanatory variable in unraveling 
tensions between global agents and local actors.  As it now stands, actions by MNC 
agents can be detrimental to both traditional emerging economy and to the MNC itself for 
two reasons, grounded in resource dependency theory and conflict theory.  
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Resource dependency theory. In the long term, over the next quarter to half 
century, the resources needed for MNC strategic success will be ever more located in the 
traditional emerging economies of Africa, the Middle East, South America and Asia. 
These resources include energy, untapped natural resources and minerals, employees, and 
increasingly, new markets for products. As the advanced market economies become 
depleted of energy sources and natural resources, as productivity and wage rates diverge, 
as more and more jobs are outsourced to low income countries, as more and more 
American debt is held by China or OPEC countries and as the huge and rapidly growing 
populations of the emerging countries are able to afford more and more consumer goods 
and industrial products, the advanced market economy MNCs will become ever more 
dependent on emerging economies to achieve corporate objectives. Applying resource 
dependency theory, firms will act in self-interest, trying to gain access to, and ultimately 
control over, needed resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978); MNCs attempt to minimize 
dependencies on others for required resources while simultaneously making others 
dependent on the MNC for products or employment. In the context of the scenario 
developed above, the MNC strategy in emerging economies will be to control the 
resources located in those countries, and seek to make emerging economies dependent on 
the MNC to achieve the national objectives for their people, whether they are social, 
cultural or economic in nature.  
We have no doubt the MNCs can achieve this, and will do so in the short term. 
But it will come at an ever-increasing price, if the underlying global economic logic 
becomes more and more overbearing on the local traditional logic. There will be a 
growing dependency of the MNC on the resources and markets of the emerging 
countries, a growing dependence of the emerging countries on the MNCs efficiently and 
effectively mobilizing these resources for both the benefit of the emerging country and 
the MNC itself. Some argue these conflicting logics can mutually evolve into ever more 
complex webs and layers of institutional frames and that the conflict need not erupt. 
We hope this is correct, but given what we observe in the world today we are not 
optimistic, primarily because we believe that strategic decision makers in advanced 
market economy MNCs are largely unaware of their internalized behavioral scripts and 
taken for granted global economic logic. If these strategic decision makers remain 
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unaware of their internalized scripts and rationalities, the increased mutual dependency of 
the MNCs and traditional emerging countries may lead to more and more 
misunderstanding and eventually increased conflict.  
Conflict theory. The underlying premise of conflict theory is that societies and 
organizations struggle to maximize their own objectives and benefits (Collins, 1975). 
Each society and organization will compete to control the scarce resources required to 
achieve its particular objectives. Under conflict theory the dispute resolution mechanism 
is competition, not consensus or compromise. Conflict is more volatile when there is 
structural inequality in terms of power distribution or reward (Dutta & Mishra, 2005). If a 
weaker player perceives the stronger player enjoying significantly unequal distribution of 
resources or rewards, the weaker player will eventually attack the stronger player, even if 
this appears to the strong player to be irrational. In 2006 ten percent of the world’s 
population controlled for 85% of the world’s wealth, while the bottom half of the world 
population owned barely one percent of global wealth (Davies, Sandstrom & Wolff, 
2006) This may lead to conflict, which is destructive of the resources on which both the 
advanced market economy MNCs and the populations of the emerging economies 
depend.  There is sufficient evidence to support this claim, ranging from peaceful protests 




Dacin, Ventresca, and Beal (1999) remind us that economic activity does not 
occur in a vacuum, but rather is nested in patterns of economic and social relationships. 
This is the key to the uneasy interaction between global and local forces: global economic 
logic is enacted as strategies of MNCs embedded in the patterns of economic and social 
relationships of the advanced market economies, while the local traditional logic is 
embedded in the incremental patterns of social relationships of the traditional emerging 
economies. These institutional frames are different, and often inconsistent (Farashahi & 
Molz, 2004). 
Further research: We present this as a viewpoint paper, and we hope empirical research 
can be carried out to verify, modify, enhance or refute our conceptualization, using our 
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model as an ideal type template. Research could be done using secondary data and event 
studies of failed MNC – local traditional economy interactions, mapping out the sequence 
of interactions and applying the ideal type to sort the data (Doty & Glick, 1994). 
Alternatively, rich case studies can be developed through fieldwork directly immersing 
the researcher in the milieu of a brewing conflict between a MNC and its host 
community. This requires researchers to immerse themselves in the unique environment 
of the MNC agent – local actor interaction, and using the relevant points of tension to 
understand the seeds of disagreement. Both approaches would add value to better 
understanding the emergence of MNC local conflict. 
 We offer a final question to stimulate further debate on this topic, inspired by the 
viewpoints presented in this article.  Drawing on the institutional theory, are 
isomorphic/hegemonic pressures preventing or inhibiting academic researchers, 
expatriate managers, and corporate strategists from searching out new perspectives on 
MNCs in developing countries? This question prompts a self-reflection on the dominant 
logic and behavioral scripts used by individuals in managerial decision-making.   
Summing up: Our two brief examples of Bechtel and Rio Tinto have called attention to 
situations where the agents of a MNC misunderstand the local realities in a traditional 
emerging economy, leading to failure. Our contribution is to provoke debate among 
scholars over why MNCs experience uneasy or conflictual relations in traditional 
emerging economies.  We further suggest that an ambidextrous knowledge and use of 
these logics is a possible avenue to reconciling relationships, and developing more 
munificent relationships.   
We present this Viewpoint Paper to stimulate debate, grounded in our 
observations but situated within an academic model. First, we frame our analysis in 
comparative economic systems, grounding the argument in institutional theory. Second, 
we extend this by introducing an examination of process, using concepts of dominant 
logic, behavioral scripts and differentiating each of these for MNC agents and actors 
representing local traditional values. Third, this framework can be tested empirically 
using an ideal type research protocol (Weber, 1949). Fourth, we propose the resource 
dependency and conflict theories to strengthen the argument that an organization benefits 
from the adoption of strategies that encourages agents to be open to understanding and 
18 
learning the underlying logic of the host country.  This point is critical both for theory 
and for practice, as businesses engage increasingly in international activities, and in doing 
so, they increase the frequency of interactions with, and potential impact on local firms, 
communities, and institutions. 
We argue that there are important reasons why MNCs would gain from 
understanding the logic of actors from developing economies, while continuing a global 
economic logic.  Further, we suggest that MNCs’ activities will be ever more dependent 
on resources from traditional economies and their awareness and integration of the local 
traditional logic will be mutually beneficial.  In an environment where countries are 
increasingly imposing pressures on corporations, MNCs’ ability to create close 
relationships in local developing economies can positively impact MNCs’ survival and 
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Comparative summary of dominant logics 
 
 Advanced Market Economy 
 
Global Economic Logic 
Tradition Based Emerging 
Economy 
Local Traditional Logic 
Dominant force Economic Conceptualizations 
of efficiency, effectiveness and 
surplus 
Anthropological 
conceptualizations of tradition 
Supremacy of Market Tradition, community, clan 
Role of market To achieve economic objectives To obtain goods needed to 
sustain life, community, 
tradition 
Role of tradition To legitimize economic 
rationality 
Historical bridge to current and 
future rationality 
Governance by Self regulatory markets Traditional guidance 
Property rights Well defined and organized to 
generate economic surplus, 
formal institutional structure 
Often community based, 
organized to sustain human 
relationship with tradition, and 
clan, informal institutional 
structure 
Decision criteria Economic cost benefit Respect for tradition 
Temporal 
considerations 
Fast decisions, short to medium 
term orientation 
Slow decisions, medium to long 
term orientation 
Geocentricity Global Local 
Social networks Instrumental to achieve 
economic objectives 
Core to clans and community 
Key philosophers Neo-liberalism – Smith, 
Friedman 
Local dominant philosophies: 
Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam, 
Christianity, etc. 
Polanyi 
Knowledge  Science / Truth / Positivism Historical and traditional 
wisdom / Interpretive 
Benchmarks Results, performance  Process, sustainability  
 
 
 
 
